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CASE NOTES
tuted punishable crimes.18 Consequently, the principle established by this
case, if accepted by other courts, will create an unmerited extension of
the doctrine of double jeopardy and allow the guilty to go unpunished
because of a technicality.
18 United States v. Tynen, 78 U.S. 88 (1870).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INDIANA HABITUAL CRIMINAL
STATUTE NOT PUNISHMENT FOR STATUS
Petitioner was found guilty of the offense of vehicle taking and sentenced
to a term of from one to ten years. In compliance with the Indiana Habitual
Criminal Act,1 petitioner, having twice previously been convicted and
imprisoned for felonies, was sentenced to life imprisonment. At a hearing
on the petition for habeas corpus, completion of the one to ten year term
was averred and petitioner contended that the life sentence was punish-
ment for a status of criminality rather than for a crime. It was insisted
that since all Indiana convicts were subject to hard labor,2 continued im-
prisonment under the life term would constitute involuntary servitude in
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.3 The district court dismissed the
petition for habeas corpus. The Court of Appeals, for the Seventh Cir-
cuit, affirmed the dismissal of the petition. United States v. Dowd, 271
F.2d 292 (C.A.7th, 1959).
Historically, the habitual criminal statutes in the various states have
often been attacked on constitutional grounds, 4 but have almost invaria-
bly been sustained by the courts. 5 Among the more forceful assertions
against constitutionality have been arguments that these statutes evoke
cruel and unusual punishment, denial of due process and/or double jeop-
ardy. In answering the cruel and unusual punishment argument, the
courts have pointed out that this phrase as used in the Constitution refers
to physical torture and not to duration of time that a convicted criminal
is to spend imprisoned. 6 In refuting the denial of due process argument,
the Supreme Court has held that the imposition of a heavier penalty under
these Acts is not per se violative of due process.7 In rebutting the double
jeopardy argument, the Supreme Court has maintained that the heavier
1 Ind. Rev. Stat. (1956) §§ 9-2207, 9-2208.
2 Ind. Rev. Stat. (1956) § 13-238.
3 U.S. Const. Amend. XIII.
4 E.g., State v. Mead, 130 Conn. 106, 32 A.2d 273 (1943); State v. Zywicki, 175 Minn.
508, 221 N.W. 900 (1928); State v. Le Pitre, 54 Wash. 166, 103 Pac. 27 (1909).
5 But cf. Goeller v. State, 119 Md. 61, 85 At. 954 (1912).
6 E.g., Gibson v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 748, 265 S.W. 339 (1924).
7 Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
punishment is not for prior offenses but is a more severe penalty for the
last crime because the defendant is an habitual criminal.8 Related to the
cruel and unusual punishment argument, and equally unsuccessful, is the
contention that in these cases the penalty is disproportionate to the nature
of the offense. 9
Although the Habitual Criminal Acts have withstood many similar con-
stitutional assaults, they are not at all uniform in content. They differ
in scope of proscribed offenses, in adjudgment of habitual criminality and
its effect on length of imprisonment and in statutory language generally.10
However, the cases involving these statutes have disclosed a common
identity of purpose. The decisions have repeatedly stressed that the aim
of the particular statute is to provide a more severe punishment for
hardened offenders, thereby both removing them from society and afford-
ing a deterrent to others.1'
The Indiana Habitual Criminal Act under which petitioner was sen-
tenced is as follows:
§ 9-2207. Every person who, after having been twice convicted, sentenced and
imprisoned in some penal institution for felony, whether committed heretofore
or hereafter, and whether committed in this state or elsewhere within the limits
of the United States of America, shall be convicted in any circuit or criminal
court in this state for a felony hereafter committed, shall be deemed and taken
to be an habitual criminal, and he or she shall be sentenced to imprisonment
in the state prison for and during his or her life.
§ 9-2208. To authorize a sentence of imprisonment for life under this act,
the indictment or affidavit shall allege that the defendant has been previously
twice convicted, sentenced and imprisoned in some penal institution, for felonies,
describing each separately. If the trial jury, in their verdict, find these facts
to be true, and convict such defendant of the third felony, the trial court,
after passing sentence of imprisonment for a specific term, as prescribed by the
statute, shall proceed to sentence the defendant to imprisonment for his or her
life.X2
The twofold sentencing aspect outlined in the second paragraph (§9-
2208) of the Indiana Act, is unique. 18 It is this uniqueness which peti-
tioner attempted to exploit in seeking to have his life sentence declared
8 Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673 (1895).
9 In re Rosencrantz, 205 Cal. 534, 271 Pac. 902 (1928).
10 Cal. Pen. Code (1959) S 644; Wisc. Stat. Ann. (1958) S 959.12; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1953)
S 431.190; Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. (1949) S 8820.
"E.g., Davis v. O'Grady, 137 Neb. 708, 291 N.W. 82 (1940).
12 nd. Star., Burn's 1950 Repl., SS 9-2207, 9-2208 (emphasis supplied).
18 The Habitual Criminal Statutes of states do not provide for separate sentences;
the life sentence alone is imposed under these statutes, no distinct term for the last
offense being described. That is, in their sentencing aspect, these statutes equate with
the first paragraph (0 9-2207) of the Indiana statute. Refer to the California and Ken-
tucky statutes cited in note 10, supra.
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unconstitutional. The attempt failed, but the case does represent the first
reported decision resolving an alleged conflict between the Thirteenth
Amendment and an Habitual Criminal Statute. 14
Involuntary servitude "except as punishment for crime" is prohibited
by the Thirteenth Amendment.15 The controversy here then was whether
or not petitioner's life term was imposed as a penalty for crime. In set-
tling this issue the majority held that the life sentence was imposed, not
for the status of habitual criminality but as an "incident to a conviction
of crime"'16 and outside the ban of the Thirteenth Amendment. A con-
curring opinion advanced the theory that the life sentence was "punish-
ment for crime" and therefore within the exception to the Thirteenth
Amendment because it was imposed "for the criminal conduct of com-
mitting a third felony with a record of two prior criminal convictions."'17
The dissenting opinion strongly urged the validity of petitioner's argu-
ment: "The life sentence is for being a 'Habitual Criminal.' It is not a
sentence for the commission of the third felony of vehicle taking. Sen-
tence [for vehicle taking] was separately imposed and has been served by
the petitioner. The life sentence is imprisonment for a status. It is not
'punishment for crime' and violates the Thirteenth Amendment."'
The dissent is based upon a literal interpretation of the statute, but
since such a statute is not self-executing, the key to its correct interpreta-
tion must be judicial determination of legislative intent. This same court
in Goodman v. Kunkle' 9 held that habitual criminality is a status and not
a crime, and the Indiana Supreme Court decided in Kelley v. State20 that
the additional punishment under the act is for the last offense only. Taken
together, these two cornerstone cases necessarily lead to the conclusion
that, although habitual criminality is a status, the defendant, in Dowd, was
punished not for that status, but rather only for the latest crime of vehicle
taking. In Witte v. Dowd,21 the defendant had been convicted of forgery
and found to be an habitual criminal. The trial court then entered a sen-
tence of life imprisonment without first and separately imposing a sen-
tence for forgery. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the failure to
impose the separate sentence for the specific crime was a mere irregular-
ity and did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to enter the life sentence.
The decision in Witte can have no meaning other than that the life sen-
14 See Smith v. State, 227 Ind. 672, 87 N.E.2d 881 (1949). But see Witte v. Dowd,
230 Ind. 485, 102 N.E.2d 630 (1951).
15 U.S. Const. Amend. XIII.
16 United States v. Dowd, 271 F.2d 292, 295 (C.A. 7th, 1959).
17 Ibid., at 297.
18 Ibid., at 298 (emphasis supplied). 20 204 Ind. 612, 185 N.E. 453 (1933).
1972 F.2d 334 (C.C.A. 7th, 1934). 21230 Ind. 485, 102 N.E.2d 630 (1951).
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tence was imposed for the last crime. While forgery was the only crime
charged there, the court failed to enter a specific term for it and the life
sentence was allowed to stand. The logical inference from Witte is that
the court recognized the double sentencing aspect of §9-2209 of the Act
to be a procedural implementation of §9-2208 and not as determinative of
substantive rights. The imposition of separate sentences does serve to em-
phasize the disparity between the punishment accorded habitual criminals
in Indiana and that accorded first or second offenders. First or second of-
fenders would, of course, receive only the specific term and not the life
sentence.
Another constitutional attack on an habitual criminal statute is thus
repulsed. It is felt here that these statutes are vincible only by repeal. And
repeal is incomprehensible unless and until legislators begin to doubt the
punitive and deterrent values of long-term imprisonment.
CONTRACTS-DEFENSE TO THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY
RIGHTS NOT AVAILABLE UNDER COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT IN ABSENCE
OF EXPRESS PROVISION
The United Mine Workers of America entered into a collective bar-
gaining contract with nine coal operators, one of which was the Benedict
Coal Corporation. The agreement provided that a union welfare fund
was to be established and maintained from royalties on each ton of coal
produced by the corporation for sale or use. The trustees of the fund
brought suit as third party beneficiaries for a portion of the royalties
which the corporation failed to pay under the collective bargaining
agreement. The Benedict corporation cross-claimed for a larger amount
as damages sustained from strikes and stoppages by the union in violation
of the collective bargaining contract, and claimed that payment to the
welfare fund was excused in proportion to the violation of the agreement
by the union. The jury returned a verdict for the trustees, but also found
in favor of the corporation on the cross-claim. The district court gave
effect to Benedict's defense by refusing immediate execution and payment
of interest on the trustees' judgment. Instead, it ordered that the judgment
be satisfied only out of the proceeds collected by Benedict on its judg-
ment against the union and paid into the registry of the court by the
union.
Both the union and trustees prosecuted separate appeals to the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The court of appeals affirmed the dis-
trict court, except that it held the amount of the damages awarded to
